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SMALL NUMBERS, BLACK MEN, PRECIPITOUS
RESPONSES, BIG PROBLEMS
MICHAEL A. MIDDLETON*
Professor Culp has aptly warned us that in our discussion of
employment discrimination we should not lose sight of the need to
address the spectrum of policies affecting the status of African-
Americans. Without serious efforts in all aspects of American life (e.g.,
housing, education, health care, political and economic empowerment)
our chances of significantly improving the future for African-American
men are slim.'
Professor Culp, in his article, focuses on the federal mechanism for
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended.2
He concludes that the Title VII enforcement mechanism has failed to
significantly change the status of African-American men in the workplace
and attributes this failure to narrow interpretations of the law by the
Supreme Court and several lower courts. Culp asserts that these narrow
rulings are the result of an excessive concern of courts to avoid
erroneous findings of discrimination against employers and a lack of
concern about erroneous findings of no discrimination.' Culp concludes
that the courts will not be helpful, and proposes a two step solution. His
solution entails removing large numbers of Title VII cases to an
administrative process modeled after the National Labor Relations Board
and expanding some of the Court's narrow interpretations of substantive
law.4 Professor Culp asserts that these steps will reduce the cost of
defending Title VII cases, and will provide legal authority more
favorable to plaintiffs in discrimination cases.' He suggests that these
positive results would encourage employers to hire greater numbers of
Copyright © 1994, Michael A. Middleton.
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A. 1968, University of
Missouri; J.D. 1971, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. Similarly, this Symposium's focus on African-American men should not suggest
any lack of concern for the condition of African-American and other women and other
Americans disadvantaged by the various "-isms" that plague us all.
2. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and the
Supreme Court: A Reform Program for Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 241
(1994).
3. Id. at 246.
4. Id. at 262.
5. Id.
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African-Americans, and would create the political coalitions necessary to
support his recommended substantive changes in the law.6 While I agree
that there is much to be said in favor of rethinking the way in which we
enforce the antidiscrimination mandate, I believe that Professor Culp's
characterization of the problem may be somewhat distorted, and that his
proposed solution is potentially dangerous.
Professor Culp has accurately described the perspectives of Title VII
plaintiffs and defendants in explaining their concerns over what he terms
Type 1 and Type 2 errors. No doubt the victims of employment
discrimination and their proponents are primarily concerned with Type 1
errors-the finding of no discrimination when in fact it has occurred.
Employers are legitimately concerned with Type 2 errors-the finding of
discrimination when none has occurred. Culp has accurately noted that
the problem of Type 2 errors has attracted more of the Supreme Court's
attention in recent years.7
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co.' and in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio,9 the Court was clearly concerned over the
employers' alleged fear of Type 2 errors. The employers' "fears" were
expressed through the not so veiled threat that quota systems would be
employed in order to avoid the establishment of a prima facie case of
disparate impact. The Court was so receptive of the employers'
argument that it modified disparate impact theory in order to afford
employers a significantly diminished defensive burden."0 This concern is
so great among some members of the Court that it led Justice Scalia in
his dissent in Johnson v. Transportation Agency to the incredible
conclusion that as disparate impact theory had historically been
interpreted, it might be a "breach of duty to shareholders" for an
employer to fail to violate Title VII by "engag[ing] in reverse
discrimination."" The Court's rejection of the "bottom line" defense in
Connecticut v. Teal 2 is apparently insufficient to alleviate its fear of
quotas.' 3  As professor Culp notes, "the fear that an employer's
6. Id.
7. Id. at 243.
8. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
9. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
10. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 992-93; Atonio, 490 U.S. at 651.
11. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 676 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
12. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
13. The Court apparently saw Teal as doing little to discourage employers from
(continued)
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apprehension regarding Type II errors will force it to implement a quota
system"'14 has indeed driven the Court to modify an entrenched and
fundamental component of antidiscrimination jurisprudence-adverse
impact theory.' 5 Yet, it is important to note that it is the employer's
reaction to allegedly anticipated Type 2 errors, and not the errors
themselves, that has been of concern to the courts. The modifications in
disparate impact theory that were crystallized in Watson and Atonio did
not develop out of experience with a large number of Type 2 errors.
Rather, these modifications arose from an unwillingness to call the bluff
of employers that they were willing to engage in widespread preferential
treatment of blacks in order to avoid the cost of defending against a
prima facie disparate impact case.
Culp asserts that a similar concern with minimizing Type 2 errors has
resulted in an unduly narrow reading of disparate treatment theory. This
narrow reading has, in his view, made it difficult for Title VII plaintiffs
to avoid Type 1 errors when proving intentional discrimination through
the inferential model of proof formulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 6 Professor Culp uses the Court's recent decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks7 to make his point. The Type 2 problem that the
Court in Hicks was trying to avoid, however, was not the Type 2
problem that has resulted in the modification of disparate impact theory.
In the disparate treatment cases that Professor Culp criticizes, the Court
was reacting not to the threat of engaging in possibly inappropriate quota
hiring to avoid the making of a prima facie case, but rather to the
possibility that actual Type 2 errors would occur if fact-finders relied too
engaging in inappropriate efforts to avoid the establishment of a prima facie impact case,
because it only denied employers an illegitimate defense to the disparate impact claims of
those blacks not included in the bottom line.
14. Culp, supra note 2, at 245.
15. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971).
16. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell-Douglas Corp., the Court established a
method of analysis that enables a plaintiff to prevail without direct evidence of intentional
discrimination. Id. at 802. Intentional discrimination is proved to be the cause of an
individual adverse employment action where the plaintiff establishes membership in a
protected class, qualification, application and rejection for a position or benefit, and
availability of the position or benefit and where the employer fails to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. Where the employer does
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff may still prevail upon
showing that the articulated reason was not the real reason but a pretext for intentional
discrimination. Id. at 802-03; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
17. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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heavily on the presumptions and burden shifting of the McDonnell-
Douglas model of proof."s Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks reflects a
desire of the Court to enable fact-finders to avoid Type 2 errors. Judge
Posner's opinion in E.E.O.C. v. Consolidated Service Systems, 9 also
cited by Professor Culp in support of his conclusions, reflects the same
concern. Both cases give the fact-finder in disparate treatment cases the
flexibility to find no discrimination where, in that fact-finders judgment,
discrimination does not exist. Neither Consolidated Service Systems nor
Hicks, however, constitutes a major doctrinal shift in Title VII
jurisprudence comparable to the Court's recent effort in the disparate
impact area. Judge Posner in Consolidated Service Systems merely
concluded that a disparity between a workforce and a relevant labor
market coupled with passive recruitment policies may establish a prima
facie impact case, however, disparity alone may not give rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination.2' Despite Judge Posner's dictum
bemoaning the horrors of Title VII's application to small ethnically
identifiable employers, the case is consistent with established Title VII
law.
Justice Scalia in Hicks does no more than give the fact-finder the
flexibility to disbelieve the presumption that intentional discrimination
was the cause of an adverse employment decision, even in the face of a
finding that the reason offered by the defendant is false. Critics, Justice
Souter and Professor Culp included, have charged that the decision
constitutes a reversal of a long line of Title VII precedent.2' While it
may be true that the decision is inconsistent with the often quoted
language in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
describing the pretext stage,22 I believe the Hicks decision is doctrinally
consistent with established disparate treatment analysis. If we accept the
notion that intentional discrimination is required for a finding of disparate
18. See Culp, supra note 2, at 248-50.
19. 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
20. Id. at 236.
21. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by
Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens in a dissent asserting that "[d]espite the Court's
assiduous effort to reinterpret our precedents, it remains clear that today's decision stems
from a flat misreading of Burdine and ignores the central purpose of the McDonnell
Douglas framework .... " Id.
22. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)
(allowing plaintiff to prove pretext "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence").
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treatment, and we understand the prima facie case for what it is-an
evidentiary trigger for shifting the burden of production to the defendant
to come forward with evidence sufficient to have the presumption "drop
from the case,"23 the defendant may have sufficient evidence to meet its
burden of production;2 4 therefore we must give the fact-finder the
opportunity to make the ultimate determination whether intentional
discrimination was the cause of the adverse employment decision.25
Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks was unfortunate in that given the facts in
that case, it is difficult to imagine that the adverse employment decision
at issue was based on anything other than the plaintiffs' race.26
Nevertheless, under existing Title VII jurisprudence, it is inappropriate to
find a Title VII violation under disparate treatment theory unless the fact-
finder concludes that intentional discrimination caused the adverse
employment decision.
It is clear that the Supreme Court has recently interpreted Title VII in
a way that minimizes its utility as a vehicle for maximizing black
employment. In the disparate treatment area, the Court appears to be
attempting to limit Title VII to its "antidiscrimination" focus only-
treating Title VII as a statute designed only to prevent employers from
making employment decisions based on impermissible factors. Using
this antidiscrimination focus, the Court in Hicks applied Title VII's
disparate treatment model in a way that expands the fact-finder's
flexibility in determining whether intentional discrimination occurred in a
given situation. This development should be distinguished, however,
from the Court's treatment of disparate impact theory. As noted above,
the Court's modification of disparate impact theory grew out of a concern
23. Id.; United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715
(1983).
24. The defendant must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254-55.
25. Aikins, 460 U.S. at 715.
26. The district court implied that the adverse employment decision was based on
personal animosity rather than racial discrimination. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr.,
756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Nevertheless the alleged discriminating official testified that
there was no personal animosity between himself and the plaintiff. 113 S. Ct. at 276
(Souter, J., dissenting). I suppose that the district court found that the official was lying
when he articulated his legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and he was lying when he
asserted that there was no personal animosity. In the face of these lies, it is difficult to
see how, or more importantly why, the district court believed a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason existed.
1994]
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that employers might adopt unlawful preferential hiring practices to avoid
the cost of defending a disparate impact action. This yielding to threats
of unlawful responsive discrimination as a justification for a major
modification to established antidiscrimination law is a cause for much
concern. 27  The Court's effort in Hicks to refine disparate treatment
theory in an attempt to ensure that the fact-finder is not unduly bound by
the McDonnell-Douglas presumptions raises different issues.
The Court's effort to refine disparate treatment theory may, as Culp
suggests, grow out of a desire to avoid Type 2 errors and will
undoubtedly make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. Nevertheless,
this refinement does not represent the kind of wholesale shift in civil
rights jurisprudence that the modifications to disparate impact theory
entail. The Court's modification of impact theory in Wards Cove can be
seen as an attempt to reverse 25 years of precedent largely in response to
employer assertions that instead of complying with the law, they Will
engage in preferential hiring to avoid liability. The Court's refinement of
disparate treatment theory in Hicks can reasonably be seen as a mere fine
tuning of existing precedent in order to avoid erroneous findings of
discrimination. 28 The Hicks decision seems to be an effort to ensure that
Title VII is confined to its original narrow antidiscrimination focus. The
Watson and Atonio decisions sought to redefine the concept of unlawful
employment discrimination.29  While both developments, absent
Congressional action, have the effect of hampering a plaintiff's chances
of successfully proving discrimination, enhancing the likelihood of Type
1 error and minimizing the likelihood of Type 2 error, they do not grow
out of the same concerns and do not necessarily call for the same
response.
Professor Culp would like to see Title VII have a far greater impact
on the American workplace than it has had in the past. Culp recognizes
27. The Court's modification of disparate impact theory in Antonio has been largely
addressed by Congress through its reaffirmation of the Griggs standard in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. How one can be assured that the
courts do not modify established law due to threats that absent modification the law will
serve as an incentive for other violations is a subject beyond the scope of this paper.
28. While some of the language in Hicks, Consolidated Service Systems, and other
cases may reflect a lack of appreciation on the part of some judges for the social and
policy goals that proponents of vigorous Title VII enforcement seek to advance, the
decisions themselves are not so ominous as to justify precipitous modifications to the Title
VII enforcement mechanism.
29. See Michael A. Middleton, Challenging Discriminatory Guesswork: Does
Impact Analysis Apply?, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 187, 223-35, 239-41 (1989).
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that the economic status of African-Americans as a group has not
changed dramatically in the 30 years since the passage of Title VII.
Consequently, he suggests that Title VII should be interpreted in a
manner that operates to maximize the employment of African-Americans.
He would adopt broad goal-oriented legal theories that would operate to
impose a sanction on employers who fail to employ "a certain percentage
of black workers. ,30 In Professor Culp's view, "antidiscrimination policy
attempts to . . . tell employers that if they meet appropriate standards,
they will not be responsible for paying discrimination claims." 3, He sets
as the primary goal of his reform proposal an increase in the number of
black employees hired, and advocates "a program that gives employers
the proper incentive to hire black workers and not to balance that hiring
with litigation expenses."32 The proper incentive, in his view, is to retain
Title VII's sanctions, but to reduce the costs associated with getting to the
sanction point.33
Because he views the Court as overly concerned with avoiding Type
2 errors and unconcerned with avoiding Type 1 errors, he has concluded
that "we are unlikely to be freed by interpretations of the Court. "'
Therefore, in addition to modifying substantive Title VII law, he
proposes adjudicating Title VII claims outside of the Article III Courts.
His specific proposal involves two basic components. First, he would
alter the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission so that it functions
similarly to the National Labor Relations Board in that claims would be
investigated and prosecuted by the agency's General Counsel and
adjudicated before administrative law judges. Second, he would adopt
the "bottom line" defense which was rejected by the Court in Teal.
Moreover, he would repeal Hicks through legislation requiring that the
real reasons for adverse employment decisions be put forward by
defendants in disparate treatment cases. These changes, Culp suggests,
"improve the incentives we give to employers to deal with, hire, and
promote black men and women."35
I agree that the present state of affairs for African-Americans might
well justify a national program or policy dedicated to the maximization of
30. Culp, supra note 2, at 255-56.
31. Id. at 257.
32. id. at 260.
33. Id. This in itself seems a non sequitur since historically under Title VII, the
cost was the sanction.
34. Id. at 254 (citing GIRADEAU SPANN, RACE AND THE COURTS (1992)).
35. Id. at 262.
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black employment. My difficulty with Professor Culp's proposal is that I
question whether it is feasible or advisable to attempt an expansive
interpretation of Title VII, beyond its antidiscrimination focus, in order
to make it the primary mechanism for accomplishing that result.36
Moreover, even if I were willing to concede that Title VII interpretation
should be driven by the anticipated collateral consequences of its
enforcement rather than a strict adherence to non-discrimination
principles, I would question whether Professor Culp's reform proposals
would accomplish the goals he has set.
In saddling Title VII with the responsibility for significantly
increasing the employment of African-Americans, rather than providing
remedies for the denial of equal employment opportunity, Culp sets Title
VII up for failure. Clearly Title VII has not achieved, and was not
designed to achieve, full employment of blacks.37 In establishing broad
economic goals for Title VII, Culp simultaneously establishes its failure
and, having done so, submits a "modest reform proposal" that he asserts
will accomplish his goals. 38 There is no doubt that the existing Title VII
enforcement mechanism could be improved. A number of commentators
have made thoughtful and constructive proposals for change that deserve
serious consideration.39 These proposals have recognized the utility of
the current enforcement model and offer modifications designed to make
it more efficient and effective. My fear regarding Professor Culp's
proposals is that they fundamentally alter the existing enforcement
mechanism, thus reducing Title VII's effectiveness in enforcing its
36. Few would disagree that a fundamental goal of Title VII is to improve the
economic position of African-Americans or that Title VII's design was to accomplish that
goal through strict enforcement of the antidiscrimination principle. See, e.g., Robert
Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of
Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REV. 531 (1981); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of
Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971).
37. Culp, supra note 2, at 256.
38. Id. at 260.
39. See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment by David A. Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695 (1991); Mary E. Becker, Needed in
the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual
Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659 (1991); Robert Belton, The Dismantling
of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third
Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223 (1990); David L. Rose, Twenty-five Years
Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1989).
[23:267
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antidiscrimination mandate, while only potentially serving the broad
economic goals intended.
I believe that Professor Culp has fallen into much the same trap that
the Court has fallen into, particularly in connection with his treatment of
disparate impact analysis. Both Culp and the Court apl5ly an economic
analysis to what is fundamentally a justice issue, and thereby attempt to
answer questions of fundamental justice on the basis of the expected
reaction of the parties affected by the decision. Culp recognizes the trap
in his suggestion that federal judges have altered Title VII into legislation
less concerned with justice and more concerned with minimizing the
costs imposed on employers for not hiring black individuals.4" Ironically,
while Culp recognizes that Title VII deals fundamentally with questions
of justice and faults it for having failed to operate in a manner that
advances his broader policy goals, he, much like the federal judges he
criticizes, proposes reform that reduces its concern for justice and seeks
to minimize the costs imposed on employers. While this type of outcome
based approach to the development of legal principle may work to
advance some short term interests, my view is that consistency and
clarity of principle must control when dealing with the fundamental
justice issues involved in Title VII interpretation. This is particularly so
in light of the need to generate the supportive political coalitions that are
so important to the success of any reform effort.4 Any interpretation of
an antidiscrimination statute that suggests a sanctioning of discrimination
in any form will result in a loss of support for that statute and its goals.
One need only reflect on the public mischaracterization of affirmative
action programs as "reverse discrimination" to understand the difficulty
that we have in speaking of non-discrimination and affirmative action in
the same breath.
The Court, in an attempt to avoid what it perceives as the adverse
consequences of Title VII enforcement-the threat by employers to use
quotas as a means of avoiding the high cost of defense-has attempted to
utilize Title VII analysis as an incentive to prevent employers from
carrying out the threatened use of quotas. Professor Culp, focusing on
the broad economic goals he sets for Title VII, wishes to use it not as an
antidiscrimination statute, but as an incentive for hiring more African-
Americans. Professor Culp and the courts seem to be at opposite ends of
what I believe to be the same inappropriate law-and-economics model. In
40. Culp, supra note 2, at 258 n.51.
41. Id. at 260.
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my view, racial discrimination in employment is a fundamental injustice
that in only the most limited of circumstances can be justified.42 Any
interpretation of Title VII or any modification to its enforcement
mechanism that operates to undermine its effectiveness in identifying
such discrimination is unacceptable.
I fear that Professor Culp's call for a revision of Connecticut v. Teal
to establish the bottom line as a defense43 is inconsistent with the
antidiscrimination principal. It is also dangerous in the sense that by
encouraging employers to engage in what inevitably will be perceived as
inappropriate discriminatory hiring, it will regenerate a strong coalition
in opposition. Moreover, as already noted, the bottom line defense does
nothing to advance the interests of those who were excluded by a
discriminatory device that has been insulated through the creation of an
appropriate bottom line.
Professor Culp's proposal that Hicks be repealed is reasonable. To
the extent that the Hicks decision can be viewed as encouraging
employers to offer fabricated reasons for disparate treatment, it should be
legislatively modified-not because the decision is wrong, but because
the decision impedes the process of finding the truth.
Culp's proposal that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
be altered to take on functions similar to the National Labor Relations
Board poses the most serious problems. I fear that this proposal will
result in the institutionalization of a "claims adjustment" approach to Title
VII enforcement. The proposal may well reduce the cost to employers of
defending discrimination claims and will surely reduce the burden on the
federal courts of adjudicating those claims. Nevertheless, an
administrative enforcement process, that denies the charging party the
opportunity to independently file their complaint, places too much control
in the hands of an administrative agency. This agency is at least as
subject to political influence as are the federal courts, which Culp has
concluded cannot be trusted to dispense justice impartially. Whether
such an administrative mechanism will do anything in terms of enhancing
a plaintiff's chances of avoiding Type 1 errors, or encouraging
employers to employ more African-Americans, is highly speculative.
The administrative mechanism employed by the NLRB has been subject
42. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 318 (1987).
43. Culp, supra note 2, at 262.
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to harsh and legitimate criticism which makes replication of that process
a questionable venture at best."
CONCLUSION
Individual cases of employment discrimination, no matter how small,
reflect the evil that Congress intended to eliminate through the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That evil is the consideration of race in
employment decision making to the detriment of employees and potential
employees. Because of the societal discord generated by race-based
decision making, these cases should be given the highest priority in the
judicial system. While it may be appropriate to delegate some classes of
cases to an administrative process, the implications of race-based decision
making and racial subordination in this country are so significant that the
strongest signal must be sent both to wrongdoers and the general public
that such conduct will not be tolerated. In my view, it is critical that the
signal sent be one grounded in a fair and just application of sound
antidiscrimination principles.
There is indeed much to be said about the permanence of racism in
American life, 45 but there is much more to be said about the importance
of the struggle against it.' We should not accept that racial
discrimination will occur in the American workplace, set up an
administrative process to manage it, and consider our jobs completed.
We should reject all forms of unjustifiable discrimination, develop an
analysis and an enforcement mechanism that is structured both to ensure
impartial fact-finding and provide the sanctioner sufficient information to
make the difficult determination of whether illegal discrimination exists.
Finally, we should make such findings of fact in a forum that has the
power to effect meaningful remedies.
44. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1992).
45. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL 47-64 (1992).
46. Id. at 195-200..
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